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aA Call to Action
Lowering the Cost of Health Care
Joseph M. Smith, MD, PhD, FACC, Eric Topol, MDIt is beyond presumptuous to attempt a conclusion toa story that has only just begun: In every real sense,the revolution in U.S. health care, though substan-
tially overdue, is only now beginning. However, we can
describe aspects of the likely trajectory of the revolution,
key players in some of the turning-point battles, and
attributes of the fınal end-state, acknowledging that, as
Niels Bohr said many years ago, “prediction is very diffı-
cult, especially if it’s about the future.”1
As alluded to in the introduction2 and tangentially
reiterated throughout the papers3–14 in this supplement
o the American Journal of Preventive Medicine by many
f the stakeholder discussants, the U.S. healthcare system
s being crushed under its ownweight—costlier than that
f any other nation; bloated with high-volume, low-value
rocedures; and using a brittle, calcifıed care delivery
odel, twisted by decades of perverse incentives and
esistance to change. The outrageous expense of the sys-
em coupled with the fact that Americans live sicker and
ie quicker than their counterparts inmany of theworld’s
ess prosperous nations provide ample evidence of the
eed for change. The awkward, ineffıcient, and ineffec-
ive U.S. healthcare system is now colliding with the im-
ovable obstacle of undeniable unsustainability based on
mpossible economics that threaten our international
ompetitiveness, economic viability, and national secu-
ity, and clearly indicate that, without dramatic change,
y 2030 all of the average household income could be
onsumed by average family healthcare spending.15 And
his problem is not just about the economics. Even the
ogistics of our current healthcare delivery system (cur-
ent and projected number of providers compared to
urrent and projected healthcare needs of an aging pop-
lationwithmulti-morbidities fromchronic diseases) are
ust as fundamentally unsustainable unless dramatic
hanges are implemented.
Dramatic change inU.S. health care, therefore,must be
foregone conclusion. The operative questions are what
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An Efficient Medical Marketplace
It is well understood that one root cause of our dramatic
overspending in health care is the disarticulation between
the consumer of services (most often the patient); the
provider of services (physicians, nurse practitioners, phy-
sician assistants, hospitals, clinics); and the related fınan-
cial transaction (typically off-loaded to some amalgam of
employer- or government-provided payment systems).
The insertion of this intermediary has effaced the typical
market forces that govern supply and demand: value and
price. To create an effıcient medical marketplace, a few
substantial changes are required, as detailed below.
Price Transparency
Easily taken for granted in other aspects of our lives is the
concept of transparency in price before purchase. Simply
knowing what things cost enables competition on price
and is one important enablement of informed decision
making. Although it is hotly debated that price transpar-
ency in health care will allow for anti-competitive behav-
ior (collusion, price-fıxing, for example), it remains
largely a theoretical, academic concern. Given the sorry
state of affairs with respect to the value ofU.S. health care,
it seems at least worthy of experimentation.
But transparency of costs in isolation may be mislead-
ing. Only when there can be assurance that lower cost is
not associated with a compromise in outcome or effıcacy
(or freedom from complications) will cost data become
particularly useful. For example, there has been growing
interest in medical tourism, in which patients from the
U.S. travel to countries such as Indonesia or India for
specifıc medical procedures, operations, or treatments.16
Although this trend has risen sharply in recent years,
there is a residual concern among Americans concerning
the balance of lowered costs and state-of-the-art care.
Consumer Engagement
It is understandably diffıcult to engage consumers about
the price of products and/or services for which they do
not believe they receive bills. Perhaps it is even more
diffıcult to imagine broad swaths of consumers actively
negotiating the price of a healthcare service when some
dbyElsevier Inc. on behalf ofAmerican Journal of PreventiveMedicine
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Jthird-party payer is picking up the tab. An effıcient med-
ical marketplace requires consumer engagement, which
can be achieved through intelligent benefıt design, just-
in-time pricing information (i.e., information at the mo-
ment of a decision), and interoperability.
First, intelligent benefıt design has attracted consider-
ation since it was proposed a decade ago.17 Policymakers
have implemented or planned numerous programs that
have sparked conceptual appeal.18–20 Namely, the act of
ltering health insurance programs to encourage high-
alue services and discourage low-value care promises to
dd marketplace dynamics to the provision and con-
umption of health care, cutting overall costs, and in-
orming the ongoing debate. However, policymakers
ave focused most of their efforts on one side of this
hallenge: providing positive incentives to encourage in-
ividuals to use high-value care. The converse, imposing
isincentives for the use of proven low-value services, or
imilar disincentives for high-risk health behaviors, has
et tomake progress. Given our current predicament and
mpending crises, we can ill afford to rule out potentially
iable options without thoughtful consideration and/or
eaningful experimentation.
Second, just-in-time strategies have been applied
roadly in commercial settings to limit costs. To build an
ffıcient medical marketplace, we need just-in-time
nformation—relevant, up-to-date information about
rice, value, and outcome that can inform decision mak-
ng at the time decisions are beingmade. It is of little good
o have pricing and outcomes data about elective or even
emi-elective healthcare products and services archived
n obscure, confusing websites outside of the practical
each of consumers/patients/decision makers. Although
4 states have variations of healthcare price transparency
egislation enacted, if the requirement for transparency
an bemet by posting a limited set of average prices on an
ut-of-the-way website, very little impact should be ex-
ected. Rather, if actionable pricing information can be
rovided/pushed to decision makers in the hours or days
efore a decision is made, signifıcant savings can be ex-
ected. Payers and large employers are already exploring
uch opportunities to help their subscribers limit their
ut-of-pocket costs.21 In addition, hospitals are exploring
ays to prospectively commit to total out-of-pocket
xpenses so that patients can know in advance what
heir fınancial obligations will be for a wide range of
rocedures.22
Third, the majority of Americans receive care from
more than one caregiver or other provider—be it from an
independent physician, physician group, hospital, labo-
ratory, pharmacy, urgent-care center, worksite clinic,
school clinic, or public health site.Without integration or
seamless interoperability, concerns regarding fragmenta- e
anuary 2013tion, duplication, and error frustrate choice and elevate
switching costs. In essence, themany separate and poorly
communicating silos of the healthcare system create bar-
riers to the creation of an effıcient medical marketplace.
Two remedies are clearly apparent: The fırst is integration
or consolidation wherein a dominant system vertically
and horizontally integrates to provide a broad set of of-
ferings over a signifıcant part of the market. This creates
some operational synergies and removes some of the
concerns of a fragmented system of separate silos, but the
concentration of market presence and power can have an
anti-competitive, even a monopolistic, influence.
A second alternative to overcome fragmentation is
smooth, seamless, and functional interoperability. In-
teroperability, particularly of information systems and
associated medical devices, can enable smooth commu-
nication among the many disparate participants without
creating anti-competitive forces. Interoperability holds
the promise of making all healthcare data available to any
member of the healthcare delivery enterprise whenever
and wherever it is needed. In 2005, it was estimated that
interoperability in health information systems would
save $70 billion annually, but even that substantial esti-
mate is likely woefully short of the true value, as it does
not include the transformational effects on innovation
and competition that almost certainlywill occurwhen the
fragmentation and anti-competitive influences of propri-
etary information systems are themselves transformed
into interoperable networks.
No discussion of interoperability would be complete
without mention of the fact that its non-existence is no
accident. Instead, it is a realization of market forces that
have encouraged the development of multiple, proprie-
tary systems. Although interoperability is an unmet need
(and one that once fılled, will release great value), it is not
readily apparent how this value gets returned to any of the
stakeholders capable of creating it. In this instance of a
market failure, there may be a legitimate argument for
federal intervention, particularly in light of the fact that
the federal government is the largest payer for healthcare
services and, as a result, stands to be aligned with the
individual in achieving the greatest related benefıt.
Infrastructure Independence®
Although novel advanced medical technology is more
typically viewed as a cause of escalating healthcare costs
than as part of the solution, it has become clear that
innovation to enable smart, technology-enabled care co-
ordination can dramatically improve the management of
chronic diseases (that collectively make up more than
80% of U.S. healthcare costs) at much lower cost.23 By
arnessing innovation in ubiquitous (remote) sensors
mbodying actionable diagnostics, low-cost wireless
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ultimately linked to smooth titration of outpatient ther-
apy, it is possible to create a fundamental shift of the
paradigm in healthcare delivery and provide nearly con-
tinuous care for chronic disease, predicting and prevent-
ing costly, complex, and life-threatening decompensa-
tion.24 In addition to improving outcomes at lower costs,
this new model can alleviate some of the tremendous
stresses on the current healthcare system where the bur-
geoning demand of our aging population struggling with
chronic disease is overwhelming our capacity to deliver ad-
equate care using the current paradigm of offıce-, clinic,- or
hospital-based settings. This infrastructure-independent
model of healthcare delivery will foster the new era of
patient-centered care and lead to signifıcantly lower
healthcare costs.24
Rational Reimbursement
Incentives matter. Our healthcare system provides in-
centives to hospitals to be full; incentives for physicians to
see patients in their offıces, clinics, and hospital rooms;
and incentives for proceduralists to perform procedures.
Recently, with the support of the American Board of
Internal Medicine Foundation, nine specialty profes-
sional organizations, including those representing cardi-
ologists, gastroenterologists, and radiologists, provided
their “Top 5” lists of unnecessary procedures and tests.
This “Choosing Wisely” program represents a starting
point for professional organizations, historically reluc-
tant to take on the practice of their constituents, to reduce
unneeded yet highly reimbursed procedures.25
Patients, as it turns out, do not want to be on the
receiving end of any of these behaviors. Rather, they want
to be well and away from hospitals and their physicians.
This obvious mal-alignment of incentives and desired
outcomes is being addressed, in part, by current efforts at
healthcare reform. The know-how and capability to cre-
ate a far more rational and cost-effective system is within
our grasp, and there has never been a more important
time for the medical profession to take the lead in advo-
cating for reform. Strategies to pay for prevention, conti-
nuity of care, and better outcomes are essential. Our
current system rewards interventions for disease events
and thus encourages the care we have today.26 Reim-
ursement for prevention, early intervention, and effec-
ive long-term management is missing. Medical homes,
ccountable care organizations, and bundled payments
re just some of the vehicles being used to align provider
ncentives with desired outcomes and, in the process,
levate the practice of medicine from piece-work to ho-
istic, outcome-driven care.26Practical Regulation
In recent years, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration
(FDA), by increasing its regulatory requirements, also
has increased substantially the cost of bringing new tech-
nologies to market.27 This is borne of internal issues
relating to the agency’s apparently growing aversion to
risk and challenges with managing its review processes.
But it also reflects external pressure the FDA is under to
impose more stringent requirements on the review and
approval of medical devices. Some consumer advocates
and politicians may see regulation as a way to slow the
introduction of new technology and, in turn, lower either
adverse events (in some way attributed to new technol-
ogy) or healthcare costs.27 But it is likely that exactly the
opposite is true. Increased regulation raises the cost of
investment and development, which ultimately translates
into higher prices for the resulting technology.27 Addi-
ionally, novel technology most often represents an im-
rovement of an existing solution or a novel solution
here none previously existed, typically improving out-
omes (even net of rare imperfections).
Regulatory barriers also reduce competition by limit-
ng the number of new products that enter the market-
lace. Unfortunately, the high cost and temporal burden
f regulation preferentially inhibit the progress of those
mall, innovative start-up companies whose products
ay offer the greatest hope of disrupting the otherwise
nsustainable status quo. The larger healthcare incum-
ents, better able to bear the costs and time delays (and
ypically less interested in disrupting their own en-
conced product lines inculcated within the current
ealthcare paradigm), are aided in their interest in pre-
erving the status quo by a complex, costly, and slow-
oving regulatory system. If we are to incentivize the
eeded disruption of healthcare products and services,
e need just the opposite.
In summary, a change in healthcare delivery and pay-
ent systems is inevitable and imminent, and every
takeholder has a separate but vital role to play in this
oming transformation. This compilation of perspective
rom leaders across the healthcare continuum, from in-
ovator to payer, from provider to patient, and from
mployer to regulator, is meant to capture the near-term
teps that can be—and are being—taken aswe collectively
eform our nation’s healthcare delivery system.3–10
As one contemplates the enormity of the challenge, it is
worth noting that in some way, we have done this before.
More than 100 years ago, Abraham Flexner’s report on
the state of medical education and training effectively
revamped all of U.S. health care. It is undeniable that
another dramatic revamping is now required, and it is
perhaps worth noting that Flexner himself famously
commented on the economic challenge of his day, that of
www.ajpmonline.org
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Jsimultaneously affording both war and civilization. His
comment then applies equally to our predicament now
regarding either maintaining our current healthcare sys-
tem or having one we can sustainably afford: “We must
make our choice, we cannot have both.”28
Publication of this article was supported by the West Health
Initiative.
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